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Abstract 
This research seeks to measure the relationship between board composition (the proportion of NEDs on board, 
board size and CEO duality) and performance using ROA and ROE: A case of listed Banking and Financial 
firms in Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwean Banking and Financial sector financial crisis of 2002-2005 resulted in 
many Banking and Financial firms being liquidated and some placed under curatorship. This crisis prompted the 
RBZ to offer guidelines to restructure boards in this sector recommending a minimum of five directors made up 
with at least 60% NEDs and CEO non-duality.  Despite all these regulations, the failure rate in this sector is still 
very high. Therefore this research was seeking to establish whether it is a matter of board composition or they 
are other factors which influences the performance of Banking and Financial firms in Zimbabwe. Previous 
studies produced inconclusive results regarding the relationship between board composition and performance 
with some finding a significant relationship and others not finding any relationship. The research used 
explanatory and case study research designs in drawing out findings using Chi-square and OLS regression 
models to validate or invalidate hypotheses. Primary data was drawn from a sample of twelve expects in the 
Banking and Financial sector using questionnaires and structured interviews. Secondary data was drawn from the 
financial statements of six listed Banking and Financial firms over a period from January 2009-December 2012. 
Using Chi-square test, the results indicated that performance is not related to board composition. On the other 
hand using OLS method, only board size was found to be significantly related to performance. 
Keywords: Corporate governance, Board composition, Board Size, CEO duality,  Performance 
1 Introduction 
Corporate governance has received much attention in the current studies all over the world especially after many 
corporate scandals and the failures of some biggest firms around the world such as Commercial Bank (1991), 
Enron (2001), HIH Insurance Company (2001), Adelphia (2002) and World Com (2002) (Mizruchi, 2004). This 
resulted in the implementation of corporate governance codes and principles such as the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(2002) which was considered to be the most sweeping corporate governance regulation in more than seven 
decades (Byrnes et al, 2003). 
Studies carried out on the collapsed firms revealed that the board of directors and its committees lacked good 
supervision on the management. For example Enron manipulated its financial statements through off balance 
sheet financing. Therefore the board was unable to disclose the distorted statements as it lacked independence 
from senior executives (Deakin & Konzelmann, 2004). WorldCom materially overstated its earnings and finally 
filed for bankruptcy. The investigations showed that the audit committee failed to effectively see the managers’ 
duties (Weiss, 2005). 
Less consideration was given to the study of the Banking and Financial firms. The major reason cited is that the 
financial industry is a regulated industry; therefore corporate governance in this industry is not as important as in 
other industries (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003). 
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However the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and the 2008 global financial turmoil which triggered Banking and 
Financial Institutions failures in both developed and developing countries have made the world to become aware 
of the bad corporate governance consequences (Mambondiani, 2012). 
In Zimbabwe, from 1980-1990, banks operated under a semi-command economy dominated by foreign banks up 
until 1991 when the financial sector was liberalized as part of the Economic and Structural Adjustment Program 
(ESAP) (Mambondiani, 2012). During this phase less attention was being paid to Banking and Financial firms’ 
corporate governance and risks were kept at minimal with less bank failures. The liberalisation measures were 
prescribed to open up and de-regulate the financial sector in an attempt to promote financial development in 
particular and economic growth in general .The turn of the millennium saw an emergence and expansion of 
indigenous banks in Zimbabwe which were declaring super profits at the close of each financial year from 
operations which were later to be declared illegal by monetary authorities such as illegal foreign currency 
dealings (Muranda, 2006) 
However, there was ownership concentration in newly licensed indigenous banks, with the founders and their 
families as controlling shareholders and represented in top management and the board of directors (Mumvuma et 
al, 2003).  
The instability in the Zimbabwean economy during the late 1990s and the early 21
st
 century as a result of 
hyperinflation resulted in the collapse of 13 banking institutions, all of which were indigenous, licensed after the 
financial liberalization of 1991 (Mambondiani, 2012).  
Although the banking sector was heavily affected by macro-economic factors, the issue of bad corporate 
governance has been a major concern. 
Table 1 Summary sample of failed banks 





Liquidated Liquidity constraints. 
Financial distress  
Poor risk management. 
Board Absence. 
Insider lending. 
Non-payment of loans. 
1996 





CEO dominance & abuse of power. 
Non-banking activities. 
Unserviceable insider loans. 
Fraud. 
Poor risk management. 
27/07/12 





Poor Board oversight. 




Barbican Bank Liquidated Liquidity constraints. 
Under-capitalisation. 
CEO dominance & abuse of power. 
Imprudent banking behaviours 
25/02/13 





Abuse of corporate power. 
Non-performing insider loans. 
Poor board and management 
oversight 
11/06/12 
Genesis Bank Liquidation Under-capitalization 
Liquidity challenges. 
Incompetent Board of Directors. 11/06/12 
Century Bank Liquidation  Liquidity constraints. 
Manipulation of 
financial statements. 
Poor Board oversight. 
Poor asset and risk management. 
2004 
The RBZ prescribed new regulations that require an individual not to exceed 10% of the bank’s shareholding so 
as to improve corporate governance in banks through a shift from owner-controlled to manager-controlled banks. 
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The regulations demand banks to have a minimum of 5 directors with at least 60% independent NEDs and it also 
recommends the separation of the roles of CEO and Board Chairperson [Bank Licensing, Supervision and 
Surveillance Guideline Number 1 (2004) on corporate governance]. 
2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
The Cadbury Committee Report (1992) broadly defined corporate governance as the system by which companies 
are directed and controlled and how the corporate activities and expectations of stakeholders are aligned. This 
system involves the combination of the board of directors, management and controls that guide the firm and is 
concerned with holding goals (Borerwe, 2004). The Cadbury Report is based on the agency theory which 
recommends that boards should have a majority of outside directors who are truly independent in nature. It also 
recommends CEO non-duality, and that board size is an important aspect for effective corporate governance. 
2.1 Corporate Governance in Zimbabwe  
Corporate governance depends on the quality of the country’s macro-economic environment in terms of 
regulatory, fiscal, institutional and judicial structures, which in turn are influenced by a given country’s political 
dispensation (Beck et al, 2001). After the Enron saga, a lot of questions have been raised regarding the 
effectiveness of such arrangements in an emerging setting such as Zimbabwe, which is characterized by an even 
less sophisticated investing public, paucity of financial information and, monopoly of financial knowledge and 
skills by a limited number of people (Tshumba, 2002). 
Corporate activity in Zimbabwe is based on common law, with some Roman Dutch influence. Corporate Law 
was first embodied in the Companies Act (1951) and in the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange Act (1996). All 
registered companies in Zimbabwe, whether private or public are subject to the Companies Act. The Minister of 
Justice and the Registrar of Companies are empowered to investigate potential violation of the Act (Tshumba, 
2002). The Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE) is a body corporate established by an Act of Parliament and has 
extensive regulatory powers. The body is under the direction of the Ministry of finance and is a self regulatory 
authority. 
Zimbabwe is yet to have a developed system for measuring corporate governance as other economies. For this 
reason, it is highly recommended that a system for measuring corporate governance is implemented in 
Zimbabwe alongside a National Corporate Governance Code (Chimanya, 2012).  
 In Zimbabwe corporate governance has been gaining roots in response to initiatives by some stakeholders such 
as The Institute of Directors Zimbabwe (IODZ) who strongly believes that Zimbabwe should have its own 
national code on corporate governance that should take into account the country’s peculiar corporate governance 
challenges. Notwithstanding these developments, it must be indicated that more formal corporate governance 
structures and institutions are relatively not widespread though a number of laws provide for governance 
structures for companies in Zimbabwe. These include: 
 The companies Act (Chapter 24.03), which provides for governance of all companies incorporated in 
Zimbabwe. 
 The Securities & Exchange Commission Act (Chapter 24.25), which provides among other things for 
governance of the stock exchange, investment advisors, security dealers, and collective investment 
schemes licensed by the Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) in Zimbabwe. 
In Zimbabwe, a number of corporate governance studies have been carried out in the financial sector. Studies by 
Chimombe (1983), Tshumba (2002), Muranda (2006), Njanike et al (2011) and Mambondiani (2012) revealed a 
series of poor corporate governance practices among a sample of surveyed banks in corrupt practices and 
dealings outside the scope of the banking industry and which banks were unwilling to disclose. 
2.2 Corporate governance and Banking and Financial Institutions 
The Banking and Financial industry is the most heavily regulated sector worldwide due to its sensitive role that it 
plays in the economic system as liquidity guarantors, originators of non-market finance, information brokers 
between lenders and borrowers and payment system operators (Gorton and Winton, 2003). Therefore economic 
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prosperity and advancement heavily depend on the services provided by banks and its efficiency lowers the 
capital costs of firms, increase capital formation and boost productivity growth (Levine, 2004). 
The failure of an individual bank may affect the whole Banking and Financial sector in the economy either via 
inter-bank linkages with the ailing bank or because of the panic provoking bank runs on other non-distressed 
banks in the same economy thereby destabilizing the economic system as a whole (Calomiris, 2007). 
Therefore Banking and Financial firms need to align the interests of shareholders and other stakeholders 
including depositors and the government thereby making their corporate governance of great importance to the 
financial system of any country. This determines the key role of the Board of Directors and senior management 
for the safety and soundness of their operations. This places more emphasis on the board structure that promotes 
efficiency on the appointment of adequate board of directors capable of exercising independent judgments of the 
views of management, political interests or inappropriate outside interest (Basel committee on Banking 
Supervision, 2006). 
2.3 Non-Executive Directors (NEDs) and bank performance 
The Cadbury Report (1992) states that a firm’s degree of independence is measured by the presence of NED’s 
who are perceived to be independent of executive directors and thus have more incentive to do their role more 
effectively. 
Previous studies which investigated the relationship between board composition and banks performance as 
measured by ROA and ROE provided inconsistence results. AlManaseer et al (2012) and Pathan et al (2007) 
found a positive relationship between bank performance and NEDs in Jordan and Thailand respectively 
concluding that more board independence is associated with better performance. 
On the other hand, a negative relationship has been found in Jordan (Bino and Tomar, 2012) and Ghana (Biekpe, 
2006) all using ROA and ROE as measures of performance. 
However, Praptiningsih (2010) in four Asian countries found no significant relationship between the proportion 
of NEDs and bank performance using ROA and ROE. Belkhir (2004) using the same performance measure 
found that the relationship was still insignificant in the years leading to the inception of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(1997-2002) in USA. 
However, these studies were carried out in countries with developed Corporate Governance systems governing 
firm operations. This study seeks to measure the same aspects of Banking and Financial firms’ performance 
using ROA and ROE in Zimbabwe a country with a less developed corporate governance system. 
Therefore from the above literature, the following hypothesis can be drawn 
 H1: There is no significant relationship between the proportion of NEDs and the performance of 
Banking and Financial firms in Zimbabwe. 
2.4 Board size and firm performance 
Board size is another important attribute of corporate governance and studies identified it as having an impact on 
the effectiveness of the board in accomplishing its responsibilities (Prabowo, 2010). In corporate governance, the 
earliest literature on board size is by Lipton and Lorch (1992) and Jensen (1993) and they both emphasized its 
importance in the accomplishment of tasks. 
Andres and Vallelado (2008) studied 69 commercial banks operating in Spain, Italy, US, Canada, UK and 
France over the period 1995-2005. Their findings concluded that the inclusion of more directors in boards is 
positively associated with better performance, as measured by ROA. Ruigrok et al (2006) added that large 
boards have higher chances of linking the firm with external resources thereby bringing external information 
from the outside to help in decision making. 
On the other hand, (Neill & Dulewicz, 2010) argued that large boards usually affect team relationship and 
cohesion. Pathan et al (2007) using a dataset of commercial banks in Thailand over the period 1999-2003, also 
obtained a negative relationship between board size and performance measured by ROA and ROE. 
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However , Zulkafli and Samad (2007) in their analysis of a sample of 107 listed banks in nine countries of Asian 
Emerging markets (India, Singapore, Taiwan, Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Hong Kong), 
concluded that board size is not significantly correlated with performance measures such as ROA. 
In the Zimbabwean context, the Board of Directors of Trust Bank of Zimbabwe in 2004 though large claimed 
that they were unaware of a scenario were a significant amount of bank loans were non-performing and were 
granted without any formal agreement facilities. 
Therefore from this literature, the following hypothesis can be drawn 
 H2: There is no significant relationship between board size and the performance of Banking and 
Financial firms. 
2.5 CEO Duality and Firm Performance 
The Cadbury Committee Report (1992) recommends the separation of the role of CEO and Board Chairperson 
so as to ensure a clear division of responsibilities and thus combining the two roles indicates bad corporate 
governance. This is because the board is expected to monitor the operations of the CEO and his management 
team. The Agency theory predicts that CEOs as agents of shareholders do not always act in the best interest of 
shareholders and may abuse power as they may have unfettered powers in decision making (Fonteyn 2002). 
On the other hand, the stewardship theory supports CEO duality citing that it may improve firm performance. 
Larcker and Tayan (2011) added that CEO duality allows firms to make speedier decisions and react promptly to 
new information than non-duality as the former eliminates an extra chain of command. 
However, Dalton et al. (1998) conducted a meta-analysis of 31 studies, concluding that CEO duality does not 
affect performance and also that firm size does not moderate the duality-performance relation. Dahya and 
Travlos (2000) review ten studies on CEO duality and found the same results. 
Although these different empirical studies carried out in different economies produced mixed results, non duality 
has received considerable support as a corporate governance mechanism in resolving agency problems. The 
Banking Act of Zimbabwe (Chapter 24.20) also recommends non-duality. However under these regulations, the 
Zimbabwean Banking sector is still struggling as evidenced by the closure of many Banking and Financial firms. 
Therefore from this literature, the following hypothesis can be drawn 
 H3: There is no significant relationship between Role duality and the performance of Banking and 
financial firms. 
The issue of corporate governance is considered to involve a number of complex indicators, which face 
substantial measurement error due to the complex nature of the interaction between governance variables and 
performance indicators. However, the purpose of this study is to examine selected corporate governance 
variables namely Board composition, Board size and CEO duality and how they influence performance based on 
ROA and ROE. The study also gives due recognition to the control variables of bank size and debt, and the 
variables are carefully chosen because of data availability and measurement. 
3 METHODOLOGY  
3.1 Research Design 
The study used an explanatory research design to determine if there is a relationship between board composition 
(the proportion of NEDs on board, board size and CEO duality) and performance (ROA & ROE). A case study 
design was also suitable as the study focused on studying a case of Banking and Financial firms listed on the 
ZSE. 
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3.2 Sample and Data 
Secondary data related to performance measures, board composition characteristics and control variables from 
2009 to 2012 were collected from the ZSE website. For the six (6) Banking and Financial firms listed on the 
ZSE, 24 observations were obtained as shown in Appendix 1. 
     INSERT APPENDIX 1 
Appendix 2 summarizes the dependent, independent and control variables and their proxies. 
     INSERT APPENDIX 2 
Primary data was drawn from a sample of twenty two (22) expects in the Banking and Financial Sector using 
closed ended questionnaires and structured interviews. Twelve (12) respondents completed and returned the 
questionnaires and also responded to interviews giving a response rate of 55.55%. Baruch (1999) indicated that a 
response of approximately 35% is reasonable. 
3.3 Data presentation and Analysis 
The relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variables were presented on scatter 
graphs. Primary data was analysed using the Chi-squared test in order to determine if there is any relationship 
between board composition and performance. Pearson correlation analysis was performed in order to obtain an 
understanding of the relationship among the independent variables, dependent variables and control variables in 
the research study. To measure the relationship among these variables, the study used the Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) regression model. Statistics of frequencies such as; percentages, means, standard deviation, 
maximum and minimum are used to describe the patterns of data. 
4 Results  
4.1 Linear representation of Secondary data 
The graphs below represent the linear relationship between the explanatory variables (X-axis) and the explained 
variables (Y-axis) 
Both X-axis and Y-axis represents percentages (%) 
4.1.1 Linear representation of NEDs and ROA 
 
Fig 1 NEDS & ROA (y = 0.067 + 0.034x) 
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4.1.2 Linear representation of NEDs and ROE 
 
 
Fig 2 NEDs & ROE (y= -1.12 + 0.22x) 
Figs 1 & 2 show that there is no linear relationship between the proportion of NEDs, ROA and ROE respectively 
as represented by the scatter points which are scattered away from the lines of regression y = 0.067 + 0.034x and  
y= -1.12 + 0.22x respectively. 
4.1.3 Linear representation of Board Size and ROA 
 
Fig 
Fig 3 BSIZE & ROA (y = -2.04 + 0.44x) 
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4.1.4 Linear representation of Board Size and ROE 
 
Fig 4 BSIZE & ROE (y = -12.5 + 2.57x) 
Figs 3 & 4 shows that, though not very strong, there is a relationship between Board Size (BSIZE), ROA and 
ROE respectively as represented by scatter points scattered around the line of regression y = -2.04 + 0.44x and  y 
= -12.5 + 2.57x respectively. 
4.1.5 Linear representation of Role and ROA 
 
Fig 5 ROLE & ROA (y = 2.57 +0.03x) 
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4.1.6 Linear representation of Role and ROE 
 
Fig 6 ROLE & ROE (y = 15.69 -22.89x) 
Figs 5 & 6 show that there is co-linearity among the scatter points and lines of regression (y = 2.57 +0.03x) for 
ROA and y = 15.69-22.89x for ROE cannot be plotted. This indicated no relationship between the explanatory 
variable (ROLE) and the explained variables ROA and ROE respectively. 
4.2. Analysis of variables from secondary data 
4.2.1. Pearson correlation coefficient of variables 
Table 2 Pearson correlation coefficient 
Variables ROA ROE NEDs BSIZE ROLE BAS DEBT 
ROA  0.5953 0.1844 0.6782 -0.001 -0.0417 -0.0921 
ROE   0.1899 0.6474 0.0142 0.2508 0.3674 
NEDs    0.1321 -0.0028 0.5161 0.281 
BSIZE     0.3031 -0.1376 -0.0312 
ROLE      0.2022 0.5831 
BAS       0.03 
Table 3 indicates a positively weak association between the explanatory variable proportion of NEDs and both 
explained variables ROA (0.1844) and ROE (0.1899). This indicates that an increase by one non-executive 
director will only increase the current ROA mean by 18.44% and ROE mean by 18.99%. 
A strong positive association is found between the explanatory variable Board size and both explained variables 
ROA (0.6782) and ROE (0.6474). This indicates that an increase in board size by a single individual will 
increases ROA by 67.82% and ROE by 64.74%. 
 Role duality was found to have a very weak negative relationship both on ROA (-0.001) and ROE (0.0142). 
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4.2.3Distribution of variables 
TABLE 3 Variables distribution  
VARIABLE Obs Mean Std.Dev Mean Max 
ROA 24 .0257333 .0162356 -.0008   .06 
ROE 24 .1473583 .1000208 -.0721 .322 
NED 24 .7257292   .0872296 .6154   .8571 
BSIZE 24 10.58333 2.518051 7 14 
ROLE 24 0.0416667 .2041241 0 1 
BAS 24 8.582021 .5107323 7.5989   9.779 
DEBT 24 .8262208 .0774152 .6143   .9333 
Table 4 shows an average bank performance of 2.57%, ranging from -0.8% to 16.24% under ROA; average bank 
performance is 14.74%, ranging from -7.21% to 32.2% under ROE. From these descriptive statistics, it appears 
that banks have lower performance as compared to non-financial firms. Al-Sahid (2010) in Kuwait found that the 
mean value for ROA and ROE is 9% and 25% respectively in non-financial firms. This could be related to the 
fact that the world financial crisis starting in 2007 affected banks more than non-financial firms. 
The average proportion of NEDs is 72.57% ranging from 61.54% to 85.71% suggesting that NEDs represent the 
majority of the Zimbabwean bank boards. The mean value is above the 60% which is recommended by the 
Banking Act (chapter 24.20) meaning that on average the listed banks are complying with the rules and 
regulations of the banking sector 
CEO duality has a mean value of 0.0417 indicating that in the period under study, Zimbabwean listed Banking 
and Financial firms were complying with the rules and regulations for non-duality. 
The average Board size is 10.58 members, ranging from 7 to 14 members. The Cadbury report recommends an 
average of eight to ten directors for effectiveness suggesting that Zimbabwean Banking and Financial firms 
prefer large boards. 
For the control variables, the mean debt ratio of 82.62% ranging from 61.43% to 93.33% indicating that banking 
and financial institutions in Zimbabwe are heavily financed by debt capital. The base assets mean value of 8.582 
(expressed as a logarithm of total assets) indicating that the banking and financial institutions in Zimbabwe have 
a higher asset base. 
4.3 Regression analysis of variables 
4.3.1 Chii-squared regression on NEDs and performance 
H1: there is no significant relationship between the proportion of NEDs and performance of Banking and 
Financial firms in Zimbabwe. 
X² Statistics (0.05)(16) = 26.296 
Reject H0 if X² cal is greater than 26.296 
See appendix 3 & 4 for more information  
Since X² Cal (17.95) is less than X² (0.05) (16) result of 26.296, the null hypothesis (Ho) is accepted and 
concluded that at 5% level of significance, there is no significant relationship between the proportion of NEDs 
and performance of Banking and Financial firms in Zimbabwe.  
These results were supported by the OLS regression results which also found no significant relationship between 
the proportion of NEDs and performance. 
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4.3.2OLS Regression on NEDs and performance 
Table 4 Regression on NEDs on performance 
ROA Coef Std.Err     t   p>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
NED .0298815 .0328409 0.91 0.375 -.0391148    .0988778 
ROE      
NED .0332673 0.1898567   0.18  0.863 -.3656067    .4321414 
See Appendix 9 & 10 
Based on the t-statistic values on ROA (0.91) and ROE (0.18) which are less than 2, the proportion of NEDs on 
board is insignificant to performance and the null hypothesis is accepted. Though positive coefficients on ROA 
(0.03) and ROE (0.033) are obtained, they are very small and insignificant to influence the relationship.  
The above results indicates that in Zimbabwe increasing the proportion of NEDs on boards of Banking and 
Financial firms will not necessarily translate to the improvement of performance in terms of ROA and ROE. The 
results contradict the agency theory which argued that the presence of more NEDs on board improves firm 
performance. 
Although no significant relationship was found between NEDs and performance, further tests were carried out 
on Board size in order to find out if the size of the board influences performance in the Banking and Financial 
sector of Zimbabwe. 
4.3.3Chi-squared regression of Board Size and Performance 
H2: there is no significant relationship between board size and performance of Banking and Financial firms in 
Zimbabwe. 
X² (0.05)(16) = 26.296 
Reject H0 if X² cal is greater than 26.296 
See appendix 5 & 6 for more information 
Since X2 Cal (14.59) is less than 26.296, the null hypothesis (Ho) is accepted and concluded that at 5% level of 
significance, there is no significant relationship between board size and performance of Banking and Financial 
firms in Zimbabwe. 
However, these results contradict the findings of the OLS regression which found a significant relationship 
between board size and performance. 
4.3.4OLS Regression on board size and performance 
Table 5 OLS Regression on board size and performance  
ROA Coef Std.Err     t   p>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
BSIZE .0043618 .0011607 3.76 0.001   .0019232    .0068003 
ROE      
BSIZE .0252481 0.00671 3.76 0.001 .0111508    .0393453 
See Appendix 9 & 10 
Based on the t-statistic values on both ROA (3.76) and ROE (3.76), the null hypothesis is rejected indicating a 
significant relationship between board size and performance. Board size has positive coefficients both on ROA 
(0.0043) and ROE (0.025) indicating that an increase by one board member will result in an increase on ROA 
and ROE by 0.4% and 2.5% respectively. This indicates that although there is a significant relationship between 
board size and performance the level of significance is very low. Therefore Banking and Financial firms in 
Zimbabwe are better off if they maintain the current sizes of their boards rather than adding more directors. 
Further tests were carried out to find out whether performance is affected by role duality. 
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4.3.5 Chii squared for Role and Performance 
H3: there is no significant negative relationship between role duality and performance of Banking and Financial 
firms in Zimbabwe. 
X² (0.05)(16) = 26.296 
Reject H0 if X² cal is greater than 26.296 
See appendix 7 & 8 for more information 
Since X2 Cal (13.97) is less than 26.296, the null hypothesis (Ho) is accepted and concluded that at 5% level of 
significance, there is no significant relationship between role duality and the performance of Banking and 
Financial firms in Zimbabwe. 
These results support the findings of OLS regression which found the same results. 
4.3.6.OLS Regression on Role and performance 
Table 6: The relationship between role duality and performance 
ROA Coef Std.Err     t   p>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
ROLE .0058667    .0184128 0.32 0.754 -.0328171    .0445505 
ROE      
ROLE -.0647657   0.106446   -0.61 0.550  -.2884005     .1588691 
See Appendix 9 & 10 
Based on the t-statistic values on ROA (0.32) and ROE (-0.61) the null hypothesis is accepted concluding that 
Role duality is not significantly related to performance. These results support H3 which predicted the same. 
However, based on the coefficients of the model, Role duality is negatively associated with ROE (-0.0648) and 
positively related to ROA (0.0059). However the magnitudes of the coefficients are very small to influence any 
changes. 
However, results from the research indicated that the above measured variables cannot account for the absolute 
performance of Banking and Financial firms. During the period under study, other variables were also found to 
have influenced the performance of Banking and Financial firms in Zimbabwe. 
4.4. R-Squared value analysis 
The R-squared value of regression is the fraction of the variation in the dependent variable that is accounted for 
(or predicted by) the independent variables. The difference between R-squared and one is accounted by some 
other factors outside the scope of the study (Gujarati, 2004). 
TABLE 7 R-Squared value analysis 
Regression on No. of obs F(5,18) Prob>F R-Squared Adjusted R-
Squared 
ROA 24 4.17 .0108 0.5366 0.4079 
ROE 24 5.22 0.003 0.5919 0.4786 
See Appendix 9 & 10 
The results indicated that 53.66% of the dependent variable (ROA) and 59.19% of ROE results are being 
interpreted by the independent variables under study (proportion of NEDs, BSIZE & ROLE). Therefore 46.34% 
of ROA and 40.81% of ROE are being accounted for by other factors which are outside the scope of this study. 
Information drawn from the primary research indicated that the performance of the Banking and Financial sector 
in general was heavily being affected by macro-economic factors which include; 
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4.4.1. Political uncertainty 
The period under study, Zimbabwe was under the Government of National Unity (GNU) made up of parties with 
different political and economical ideologies. The RBZ is under the ministry of finance which was headed by the 
MDC-T. On the other end, ZANU-PF headed the Indigenization and Youth Empowerment Ministry which was 
advocating for the indigenisation of the foreign owned banks an idea which was being opposed by the Finance 
Ministry in collaboration with the RBZ Governor. Three banks under study (Baclays, BANC abc and NMB) 
have foreign ownership.  
Political risk is a key factor for capital flow and financial markets, implying that political instability may 
significantly affect both bank development and operational efficiencies. 
4.4.2. Economic challenges 
Results from the research indicated that economic challenges such as low liquidity levels that hit Zimbabwe for a 
decade (1998-2008) left a big dent that is difficult to erase from the economic setup. This restricts other activities 
which are meant to increase the capacity of banks and boost their operations. 
4.4.3. Social problem 
Low income levels and high cash withdrawals mainly after month-end salaries leave the banks with limited 
funds to generate income contributing to operational problems in the Banking and Financial sector of Zimbabwe. 
Results from the research indicated that an estimated amount of $4 billion dollars is believed to be circulating in 
the informal sector thereby affecting the operations of the Banking and Financial firms in Zimbabwe. In 
developing nations most people do not keep their money in the banks. 
4.4.4. Technological challenges 
Periodic changes in technology are also a challenge to Zimbabwean Banking and Financial firms in trying to 
match international standards. Results from the study indicated that the banks under study have an average size 
of 8.58 (expressed as a logarithm of assets) almost the same as Kuwait 8.62 (Al-Sahid, 2010) which is quite high 
in an economic setup like Zimbabwe. This large asset base lowers the ROA ratio. 
4.4.5. Legal challenges 
Banking and Financial firms in Zimbabwe are finding it hard to meet the $100 million regulatory requirements 
on capital, liquidity and credit restrictions by the end of 2013. Although this helps to stabilize the banking 
operations in the near future, Banking and Financial firms are struggling to meet the target. 
5 Conclusions 
Based on the results drawn from the Chii square test and the OLS regression models which concluded that there 
is no relationship between the proportion of NEDs on board and the performance of Banking and Financial firms 
in Zimbabwe, the research can conclude that the Banking Act (Chapter 24.20) recommendation of a minimum of 
60% representation by NEDs on board is just a matter of numbers which is failing to translate to the 
improvement in performance. Based on the weaker association of NEDs on both ROA and ROE, the research 
can conclude that an increase or decrease in the proportion of NEDs will have a very small insignificant change 
in performance under the same measures. 
Based on the results drawn from the Chii square test which concluded that there is no relationship between board 
size and performance, the research can conclude that respondents in the Banking sector do not value the size of 
the board as a contributor to performance. On the other hand, the results based on the information drawn from 
the financial statements and measured under OLS regression, board size greatly influences performance of 
Banking and Financial firms. Therefore the research can conclude that board size influence performance of 
banks in Zimbabwe. 
However, based on the small coefficients on the regression, an increase in the size of the board will not greatly 
improve performance and the firms under study are better off if they maintain their current board sizes.  
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Based on the results drawn from the Chii square test and OLS regression which concluded that there is no 
significant relationship between Role duality and performance, the research can conclude that the separation of 
the roles of CEO and Board Chairperson though good, does not necessarily translate to improved performance in 
Zimbabwean Banking and Financial sector.  
However the results from the study also indicate that factors which are outside the scope of this study accounts 
for the largest part of the performance of Banking and Financial firms. 
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Banking and Financial firms’ information 
CBZ ROA ROE ED NED BSIZE ROLE BAS DEBT 
2009 0.0268 0.1285 0.1667 0.8333 12 0 8.6556 0.8602 
2010 0.037 0.216 0.1538 0.8462 13 0 8.8369 0.8753 
2011 0.036 0.254 0.1538 0.8462 13 0 9.0235 0.887 
2012 0.045 0.322 0.1429 0.8571 14 0 9.0875 0.8686 
         
ZB ROA ROE ED NED BSIZE ROLE BAS DEBT 
2009 0.0256 -0.0721 0.2857 0.7143 7 1 8.0971 0.6143 
2010 0.0064 -0.0279 0.2857 0.7143 7 0 8.2979 0.7682 
2011 0.0246 0.1441 0.25 0.75 8 0 8.4355 0.8002 
2012 0.022 0.1381 0.25 0.75 8 0 8.5142 0.7994 
         
NMB ROA ROE ED NED BSIZE ROLE BAS DEBT 
2009 0.06 0.26 0.1667 0.8333 12 0 7.5989 0.7842 
2010 0.007 0.037 0.1818 0.8182 11 0 8.0122 0.8169 
2011 0.03 0.1818 0.25 0.75 12 0 8.2235 0.8603 
2012 0.0462 0.2772 0.2857 0.7143 14 0 8.3551 0.8634 
         
FBC ROA ROE ED NED BSIZE ROLE BAS DEBT 
2009 0.0365 0.1 0.3846 0.6154 13 0 8.2156 0.701 
2010 0.0173 0.3 0.3846 0.6154 13 0 8.3734 0.7387 
2011 0.0561 0.17 0.3846 0.6154 13 0 8.4465 0.7345 
2012 0.0431 0.18 0.3571 0.6429 14 0 8.5933 0.7752 
         
         
ABC ROA ROE ED NED BSIZE ROLE BAS DEBT 
2009 0.014 0.13 0.1429 0.8571 7 0 9.6452 0.9059 
2010 0.013 0.15 0.3333 0.6667 9 0 9.779 0.9272 
2011 0.012 0.16 0.3333 0.6667 9 0 9.0888 0.9333 
2012 0.014 0.18 0.3333 0.6667 9 0 9.2369 0.9138 
 
         
BARC ROA ROE ED NED BSIZE ROLE BAS DEBT 
2009 0.0105 0.055 0.2727 0.7273 11 0 8.3597 0.865 
2010 -0.0008 -0.0057 0.3333 0.6667 9 0 8.2277 0.8096 
2011 0.0164 0.1274 0.375 0.625 8 0 8.415 0.8711 
2012 0.0189 0.1312 0.375 0.625 8 0 8.4495 0.856 
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     APPENDIX 2 
Summary of Variables Measurement  
Name of variables Acronym Measurement 
Independent variable 
Non-executive directors NED The proportion of NEDs to total number of directors on board. 
Board Size BSIZE The total number of directors on the board. 
CEO Role Duality ROLE The proportion of CEOs who doubles as the chairperson of the 
board. 
Dependent Variables   
Return On Assets ROA Earnings Before Interest and Tax (EBIT) divided by the net book 
value of assets 
Return on Equity ROE Earnings Before Interest and Tax (EBIT) divided by the book value 
of equity and reserves. 
Control Variable   
Bank Size BAS The book value of total assets of the bank. 
Leverage/Debt proportion DEBT The percentage of total liabilities to total assets 
    
APPENDIX 3 
The relationship between the proportion of NEDs and performance  
 Strongly 
Agree 








Likert Scale Variables 5 4 3 2 1    
NEDs with 60% proportion 
improves financial 
performance 
2 4 3 2 1 12 40 3.33 
NEDs are good monitors of 
management (Agency 
theory) 
3 4 2 3 0 12 43 3.58 
NEDs act independently to 
improve performance 
2 2 4 3 1 12 37 3.08 
NEDs evaluate and put 
Executive directors under 
pressure 
2 3 3 4 0 12 39 3.25 
NEDs have full knowledge 
of their duties as directors 
0 2 2 3 5 12 25 2.08 
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CHII SQUARED CALCULATED FOR NEDs 
Observed (O) Expected (E) O-E (O-E)2 (O - E)2 
       E  
2 1.8 0.2 0.04 0.022222222 
3 1.8 1.2 1.44 0.8 
2 1.8 0.2 0.04 0.022222222 
2 1.8 0.2 0.04 0.022222222 
0 1.8 -1.8 3.24 1.8 
4 3 1 1 0.333333333 
4 3 1 1 0.333333333 
2 3 -1 1 0.333333333 
3 3 0 0 0 
2 3 -1 1 0.333333333 
3 2.8 0.2 0.04 0.014285714 
2 2.8 -0.8 0.64 0.228571429 
4 2.8 1.2 1.44 0.514285714 
3 2.8 0.2 0.04 0.014285714 
2 2.8 -0.8 0.64 0.228571429 
2 3 -1 1 0.333333333 
3 3 0 0 0 
3 3 0 0 0 
4 3 1 1 0.333333333 
3 3 0 0 0 
1 1.4 -0.4 0.16 0.114285714 
0 1.4 -1.4 1.96 1.4 
1 1.4 -0.4 0.16 0.114285714 
0 1.4 -1.4 1.96 1.4 
5 1.4 3.6 12.96 9.257142857 
TOTAL 17.95238095 
 
      
 
APPENDIX 5      
The relationship between Board size and performance 
 Strongly 
Agree 







 5 4 3 2 1    
Large Board size influence 
financial performance 
3 4 4 1 0 45 12 3.75 
Board size influence skills 
diversity 
3 4 3 2 1 45 12 3.75 
Larger boards perform 
better than smaller boards 
2 2 4 3 1 37 12 3.08 
Larger boards do not lead to 
conflict of interests 
1 2 2 3 4 29 12 2.42 
Larger boards influence 
strong board committees 
4 3 3 2 0 45 12 3.75 
Grand Totals 13 16 15 11 6 202 60 3.35 
Source: Primary data 
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CHII SQUARED CALCULATED FOR BOARD SIZE 
 
Observed (O) Expected 
(E) 
O-E (O-E)2 (O - E)2 
       E  
3 2.6 0.4 0.16 0.061538462 
3 2.6 0.4 0.16 0.061538462 
2 2.6 -0.6 0.36 0.138461538 
1 2.6 -1.6 2.56 0.984615385 
4 2.6 1.4 1.96 0.753846154 
4 3.2 0.8 0.64 0.2 
4 3.2 0.8 0.64 0.2 
2 3.2 -1.2 1.44 0.45 
2 3.2 -1.2 1.44 0.45 
3 3.2 -0.2 0.04 0.0125 
4 3 1 1 0.333333333 
3 3 0 0 0 
4 3 1 1 0.333333333 
2 3 -1 1 0.333333333 
3 3 0 0 0 
1 2.2 -1.2 1.44 0.654545455 
2 2.2 -0.2 0.04 0.018181818 
3 2.2 0.8 0.64 0.290909091 
3 2.2 0.8 0.64 0.290909091 
2 2.2 -0.2 0.04 0.018181818 
0 1.2 -1.2 1.44 1.2 
1 1.2 -0.2 0.04 0.033333333 
1 1.2 -0.2 0.04 0.033333333 
4 1.2 2.8 7.84 6.533333333 
0 1.2 -1.2 1.44 1.2 
 TOTAL 14.58522727 
 
APPENDIX 7 
The relationship between Role duality and performance  
 Strongly 
Agree 









 5 4 3 2 1    
CEO duality negatively affects 
performance 
4 4 3 1 0 12 47 3.92 
CEO duality  enhances CEO 
board dominance 
4 5 2 1 0 12 48 4 
CEO duality reduces board 
independence 
3 3 4 1 1 12 42 3.5 
Non-duality enhances the 
power of the board 
4 3 3 2 0 12 45 3.75 
CEO duality speeds decision 
making 
2 2 2 3 3 12 33 2.75 
Grand Totals 17 17 14 8 4 60 215 3.58 
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CHII SQUARED CALCULATED FOR ROLE DUALITY    
Observed (O) Expected (E) O-E (O-E)2 (O - E)2 
       E  
4 3.4 0.6 0.36 0.105882353 
4 3.4 0.6 0.36 0.105882353 
3 3.4 -0.4 0.16 0.047058824 
4 3.4 0.6 0.36 0.105882353 
2 3.4 -1.4 1.96 0.576470588 
4 3.4 0.6 0.36 0.105882353 
5 3.4 1.6 2.56 0.752941176 
3 3.4 -0.4 0.16 0.047058824 
3 3.4 -0.4 0.16 0.047058824 
2 3.4 -1.4 1.96 0.576470588 
3 2.8 0.2 0.04 0.014285714 
2 2.8 -0.8 0.64 0.228571429 
4 2.8 1.2 1.44 0.514285714 
3 2.8 0.2 0.04 0.014285714 
2 2.8 -0.8 0.64 0.228571429 
1 1.6 -0.6 0.36 0.225 
1 1.6 -0.6 0.36 0.225 
1 1.6 -0.6 0.36 0.225 
2 1.6 0.4 0.16 0.1 
3 1.6 1.4 1.96 1.225 
0 0.8 -0.8 0.64 0.8 
0 0.8 -0.8 0.64 0.8 
1 0.8 0.2 0.04 0.05 
0 0.8 -0.8 0.64 0.8 
3 0.8 2.2 4.84 6.05 
TOTAL 13.97058824 
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